Category Archives: Politics

Depolarising Politics: Talk 1

Depolarising Politics: Talk 1: Political Values, their Polarisation and Integration

This talk is a video version of a talk first given on the recent weekend retreat, ‘Depolarising Politics’. Robert M. Ellis looks first at the nature of political values, using the analysis of social psychologist Jonathan Haidt, then at how those values become polarised through absolutisation, and how we can make it possible to reconcile them by making them provisional.

The MWS Podcast 145: George Monbiot on Rewilding

Today’s guest is the British environmental writer and political activist George Monbiot. George writes a weekly column for The Guardian, and is the author of a number of books, including Captive State: The Corporate Takeover of Britain (2000) and Feral: Searching for Enchantment on the Frontiers of Rewilding (2013). He will be discussing the topic of rewilding with the chair of the Middle Way Society, the philosopher Robert M Ellis.

MWS Podcast 145: George Monbiot as audio only:

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Critical Thinking 22: The Slippery Slope Fallacy

I’m moved to return to this blog series on Critical Thinking by the appearance of a particular fallacious argument in current political discourse in the UK (in the form of the “best of three” argument about a possible second referendum on Brexit). This is an example of the slippery slope fallacy, which I’ve not yet covered in this series. This fallacy doesn’t seem to be as widely understood as it should be. I regularly see people online using “slippery slope” as though it was a justification rather than a fallacy, and even highly-educated BBC journalists seem either unaware of it, or otherwise unwilling to challenge politicians who use it.

The slippery slope fallacy, like any other bias or fallacy, involves an absolutized assumption that is usually unrecognised. In a Middle Way analysis there is always a negative counterpart to an absolutized assumption (assuming the opposite) and that’s also the case here. In the case of a slippery slope fallacy, it involves an assumption that if one acts in a particular way showing a tendency in a particular direction, this will necessarily result in negative effects that include further movement in the same direction, with further negative effects. The absolutisation here lies in the “necessarily”. Those who think in this way do not consult evidence about what is actually likely to happen following that course of action, or justify their position on the basis of such evidence. Rather, they just apply a general abstract principle about what they think must always happen in such cases. Such general abstract principles are usually motivated by dogmatic ideology of some kind.

Some classic examples of the slippery slope fallacy involve arguments against voluntary euthanasia or the legalisation of recreational cannabis. The argument against legalising voluntary euthanasia goes along the lines of “If you allow voluntary euthanasia, then there’s bound to be a creeping moral acceptance of killing. Respect for human life will be undermined. Before you know it we’ll be exterminating the disabled like the Nazis did.” The argument against legalising recreational cannabis would follow the lines of “If you let people smoke cannabis, they’ll soon be on to harder stuff. It’s a gateway drug. We’ll soon have the streets full of heroin addicts.” In both of these arguments, there is no particular interest in whether there is any evidence that the lesser effect would in fact lead onto the greater one, just the imposition of a dogmatically-held principle that proclaims what would always happen. The absurdity of assuming that this is what would always happen becomes clearer if you think about how easily we could use these slippery slope arguments against currently accepted practices: “If you allow euthanasia for dogs, you undermine respect for life and before you know it, it will be applied to humans.” or “If you allow people to smoke tobacco, they’ll soon be smoking heroin. It’s a gateway drug.” In practice, we draw boundaries all the time, and in law we enforce them. There is no particular obvious reason why new boundaries should be harder to enforce than previously accepted ones.

So now we come to the current use of the slippery slope fallacies in UK political discourse. This is by Brexiteers opposed to the idea of a second referendum – which, at the time of writing, is looking increasingly like the only viable option to release the UK parliament from deadlock over Brexit. There argument goes along the lines of “If we have a second referendum, what’s to stop us having a third one or a fourth one? We’ll never resolve the issue.” Here’s one example of many uses of this argument in the media.  As in the euthanasia and drug legalisation arguments, the objection appears to simply involve the dogmatic application of an implicit principle, in this case, that “politicians can call as many referendums as they like until they get the result they desire”. As in those arguments, also, there is no positive evidence that this would actually be the effect, nor that this is actually part of anyone’s motives. In practice, it seems much more likely that the amount of public resistance would grow the more referendums were called. In its imposition of an abstract dogmatic principle on the situation, this argument completely misses the point that the call for a second referendum is a pragmatic response to a particular situation of deadlock, not an invocation of a general political principle.

As with other biases and fallacies, there is also a negative counterpart to the positive slippery slope fallacy. This is the failure to acknowledge actual evidence that a “slippery slope” might happen, due to an absolute reaction against the slippery slope fallacy. There are some instances where there is positive evidence that a particular course of action can initiate a gradual deterioration – for instance, being unemployed is often correlated with poverty and depression. Not that everyone who is unemployed will necessarily suffer in these ways, but that your chances of becoming poor and depressed demonstrably increase once you are unemployed. The danger of further negative effects from unemployment is probably something you should take into account before you resign from your job, if you have no alternative available: but taking it into account does not necessarily mean that it should determine your response.

So, the slippery slope fallacy is just another common instance of dogmatic assumptions applied in unconscious everyday thinking. It doesn’t imply that there are no “slippery slopes”, only that you need to look carefully at the slopes before you set off down them to see how slippery they really are. You might well be able to keep your footing better than you expect.

Link to index of other blogs in the Critical Thinking series

Picture: ‘Slippery Slope’ by S. Rae (Wikimedia Commons) CCSA 2.0

Where the wild things aren’t

I’ve just been reading a highly recommended book by George Monbiot, the radical British environmental journalist, called ‘Feral: Rewilding the Land, Sea and Human Life‘. I think it’s fair to say that it’s transformed my view of rewilding, making me see important connections between it and the Middle Way. I previously thought of rewilding very much as an extreme romantic fringe of environmentalism. Given ever-increasing human exploitation of the planet, I thought it was a hard enough job even to moderate its effects, let alone throw it into reverse. But Monbiot has made me think again.

Part of the power of his book is revealed by the last part of the subtitle: rewilding is very much about us and our relationship to ourselves, not just about a high-minded focus on the environment for its own sake. The wild is a part of us, not just an aspect of the world, that we repress at our peril. Monbiot does not discuss the neuroscience, but the over-dominance of the left pre-frontal cortex, with its over-confident imposition of order and its endless confirmation bias, is an important aspect of the strained human repression of the wild. He effectively shows its self-defeating nature again and again in his account of our defensive attitudes to wildness in the world.

The over-confident imposition of order tends to neglect the complexity of our relationship with the conditions, and thus undermine our own interests in the long run. Generally, the more inequality of land ownership and the more intense the investment in human uses of the land, everywhere in the world, the more intense the monoculture and the more impoverished the biodiversity. ‘Shifting baseline syndrome’ also means that we have very restricted – localised and temporally limited – standards as to what a ‘natural environment’ looks like. This is especially evident in the highly humanised landscape of the UK, in which, for instance, the utterly treeless sheepwrecked landscape of the Glaslyn ‘nature reserve’ in Montgomeryshire is deliberately conserved exactly like that through continual over-grazing – exactly like the rest of Wales – whilst being described as “the wildest and most regionally important site”. You only need to go back a few thousand (rather than a mere hundred) years to recognise that the ‘natural’ vegetation of most of the UK is temperate rainforest, not overgrazed pasture, but it’s not only sentimental members of the public and the National Farmers’ Union who think otherwise, it’s even some ‘conservationists’.

The particularly perverse example of the British uplands is revealed particularly well by Monbiot, as he shows that the extermination of biodiversity is also so much contrary to even a hard-headed economic assessment of human interests. The bare compacted soil of the green deserts barely retains any water, so after heavy rainfall it is the riverside towns in the plains below that flood as a consequence – but the links between sheepwrecking and flooding are barely discussed. The sheep farms are only maintained at the cost of huge EU subsidies – but ones that Brexit will probably not end, as they are also supported by a British government in the pockets of the Farmers’ Union. Monbiot shows that the economic value of sheep-farming to rural communities is also much less than the revenue they could get from tourism if the uplands were rewilded – so the farmers are not even defending a coherent assessment of their own economic interests. One thing Monbiot does not discuss is also that hardly anyone in Britain even eats sheep any more – most of them are live-exported to Europe and the Middle East at the cost of huge animal suffering.

There are only a few pockets of land where re-wilding of the uplands has been tried – but sufficient to prove that it could be done. Monbiot finds those places in both Wales and Scotland (where, in the Highlands, it is deer rather than sheep that are the wreckers). Although much soil has been lost in some places, there is still sufficient in most of the uplands to support trees, together with vastly greater diversity and a much greater capacity for carbon absorption. The development and maintenance of rewilded land can be greatly aided by the re-introduction of top predators, such as wolves and lynx, who keep the numbers of grazing animals in check far more cheaply and effectively than humans can, preventing grazers destroying the forest, and in the process have a dramatic effect on the landscape.

Monbiot gives a big perspective on the possibilities for re-introduction. Reminding us that not that long ago, hippopotamuses were wallowing in what is now Trafalgar Square in London. He doesn’t realistically expect elephants and lions to be re-introduced into Britain any time soon, but does point out that the native vegetation is adapted to their presence: with the splitting properties of willows probably attributable to an ability to recover after elephant attacks. The environmental system has a complexity that we need to understand over a long period of time rather than only in the terms of one time and place. But the most striking aspect of his discussion of re-introductions to me is just the recognition that in some ways we need dangerous and inconvenient animals around for our own psychic health. If there is no wildness and threat, we tend to create our own substitutes, and these may actually be far more dangerous. Personally, reared in safe Britain, I’m not at all ready for coping with dangerous wild animals, and my experience goes no further than believing that a moss-covered trunk in Lapland was a bear, but I can see that it might be good for me to have to engage more fully with that unacknowledged area of experience.

Monbiot also talks at length about the sea, and the massive destruction of its life and biodiversity by nets that trawl the sea-bed. He narrates at length his personal experiences of dangerous forays off the Welsh coast in a kayak. I don’t share his enthusiasm for angling or his willingness to risk his life alone in small boats, but, again, I can recognise the value of this personal attempt to confront and engage with wildness, and the close connection it has with our embodied experience. In the end his argument about the sea is the same as that about the land: to rewild we have to preserve in a way that allows the biodiversity of the sea to redevelop to its amazing pre-industrial levels (where the tales of abundance are practically unbelievable today). Just as sheepwrecked pasture is not a ‘wild’ nature reserve by any stretch of the imagination, nor is a ‘marine reserve’ that still allows commercial fishing.

So what does this have to do with the Middle Way? It is obvious that absolutisation is closely related to the overexploitation and monoculture that has impoverished the environment, not just in Britain but across the world. Though there is also a reverse absolutisation that might try to deny the worth of human beings, the Middle Way nevertheless actually seems to demand quite a radical view – one that focuses on the long-term interests of human beings, rather accepting the deluded and short-sighted assumptions that support absolute monocultural answers of any kind. What is regarded as ‘moderate’ conventionally or politically is not likely to be anywhere near adequate in addressing the conditions here. The Middle Way instead takes us in the direction of allowing complex systems to form relatively stable structures that we are recognised to be a part of: i.e. getting rid of the bloody sheep.

Picture: ewe by George Gastin (creative commons – Wikimedia Commons)

Announcing our new webinar programme

We’ve got a new monthly webinar programme now open for booking, running for 13 months from Dec 2018 to Dec 2019. There will be a variety of topics, all of which involve the relationship between an area of practice or interest and the Middle Way – for example, the Middle Way and Meditation, the Middle Way and Science, the Middle Way and Judaism. This is your opportunity to find out more about a Middle Way perspective in relation to a topic that already interests you, interacting with members of the society in real time online.

For more information, including the full programme and how to book, please see this page.